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Abstract
Decision making often involves choosing between small, short-term 
rewards and large, long-term rewards. All animals, humans included, 
discount future rewards—the present value of delayed rewards is 
viewed as less than the value of immediate rewards. Despite its ubiq-
uity, there exists considerable but unexplained variation between 
species in their capacity to wait for rewards—that is, to exert pa-
tience or self-control. Using two closely related primates—common 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) and cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oe-
dipus)—we uncover a variable that may explain differences in how 
species discount future rewards. Both species faced a self-control 
paradigm in which individuals chose between taking an immediate 
small reward and waiting a variable amount of time for a large re-
ward. Under these conditions, marmosets waited significantly longer 
for food than tamarins. This difference cannot be explained by life 
history, social behavior or brain size. It can, however, be explained 
by feeding ecology: marmosets rely on gum, a food product acquired 
by waiting for exudate to flow from trees, whereas tamarins feed 
on insects, a food product requiring impulsive action. Foraging ecol-
ogy, therefore, may provide a selective pressure for the evolution of 
self-control.
Keywords: temporal discounting, impulsivity, rate maximization, 
tamarins, marmosets
1. Introduction
How individuals discount or devalue future rewards 
has intrigued economists, psychologists and behavioral 
ecologists under a number of different guises. Research-
ers studying temporal discounting often have subjects 
choose between small, immediate and large, delayed 
rewards to assess whether they can exhibit self-control 
by waiting for the delayed reward, or whether they dis-
count the value of the delayed reward and select the im-
mediate reward. Economists have examined discount-
ing as a crucial factor in constructing models of how 
humans assign utility to rewards available over dif-
ferent time-scales (Frederick et al. 2002). Psychologists 
commonly use self-control paradigms to investigate the 
cognitive mechanisms associated with delayed gratifi-
cation and impulsivity in humans and non-human an-
imals (Logue 1988). Behavioral ecologists investigate 
rate maximization to elucidate the role of evolutionary 
pressures influencing animal foraging ecology (Kacelnik 
2003). These three perspectives converge in their finding 
that the speed with which individuals devalue delayed 
rewards (the “discounting level”) can vary tremen-
dously between species, between individuals, across the 
lifetime of a single individual, and even in different con-
texts for the same individual. Why does this variation 
exist? Researchers suggest that some of this variation 
could result from differences in the rate of interruptions 
(Sozou 1998) or general cognitive ability (Tobin et al. 
1996). Understanding the source of this variation could 
help elucidate the causes of impulsivity and self-control.
Here, we examine discounting behavior in two co-
operatively breeding New World monkeys—com-
mon marmosets and cotton-top tamarins. These spe-
cies have comparable body and brain size, behavior, 
mating systems and life history trajectories (Table 1). 
Given the similarities and relatively close phylogenetic 
relationship between these species, one might not ex-
pect substantial differences in cognitive abilities such 
as discounting. A closer look at their foraging ecology, 
however, reveals one factor that might favor different 
discounting functions: in general, marmosets are signif-
icantly more gummivorous when compared with tama-
rins (approximately 70% versus 14% of feeding time, re-
spectively; Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson & Rylands 
1988), whereas tamarins are more insectivorous. Gum-
mivory requires scratching tree bark and then waiting 
for the sap to flow, while insectivory favors immediate 
acquisition of an ephemeral food source.
2. Material and Methods
To evaluate the discounting behavior of both species, we used an 
adjusting-delay, self-control procedure (Mazur 1987). Captive-born 
subjects, with no foraging-relevant experience, chose between two 
tools, one containing a small, immediate reward and the other con-
taining a large, delayed reward (figure 1). We presented each subject 
with a series of 15–32 experimental sessions composed of 10 choice 
trials. In each trial, a subject selected between two options, the “stan-
dard” option of two food pellets with no delay and the “adjusting” 
option of six food pellets with variable delay. Initially, there was no 
delay between pulling either tool and receiving access to the food. If 
the subject preferred the larger reward, we incremented the delay to 
the large reward by 1 s on the subsequent session. If the subject pre-
ferred the small reward, we decreased the delay to the large reward 
by 1 s. If the subject selected the two amounts equally often, the delay 
to the large reward remained the same. Using this method, we titrated 
the delay time to find each subject’s indifference point—the point at 
which subjects equally valued the smaller, immediate reward and 
larger, delayed reward (see Supplementary Materials).
3. Results
On average, tamarins showed indifference between 
the amounts when the six pellets were delayed for a 
mean (± s.e.) of 7.9 ± 0.6 s, whereas marmosets waited 
14.4 ± 1.5 s (Figure 2), a significantly longer delay (F1,7 
= 13.51, p < 0.01). The indifference points for individ-
ual tamarins ranged from 5.6 to 9.8 s, and for marmo-
sets from 10.0 to 19.0 s; the most self-controlled tamarin 
waited less than the most impulsive marmoset. We next 
turn to an analysis of why such species differences may 
have evolved.
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Body condition (body weight/tibia length) did not 
significantly correlate with indifference points for either 
marmosets (r 2 = 0.33, p = 0.31) or tamarins (r 2 = 0.01, p
= 0.89), excluding the influence of motivational state on 
choice behavior. Some researchers suggest that the level 
of discounting may decrease with the ratio of brain size 
to body weight (Tobin et al. 1996). This explanation can-
not account for our differences in discounting, as the 
brain : body ratio of tamarins (0.026) is almost identical 
to that of marmosets (0.027; Stephan et al. 1981).
To quantitatively assess how the marmosets and tam-
arins devalue rewards over time, we tested whether the 
patterns of discounting fit predictions made by the rate 
maximization model of discounting. Rate maximization 
theory predicts that foragers optimize the gain in re-
ward per unit time (Stephens & Krebs 1986); therefore, 
individuals should maximize the fitness value (V) of a 
choice V = A/(t+h), where A is the reward amount, t is 
the delay to reward following choice and h is the time 
required to process/handle the reward. Note that this 
function describes only short-term gain, omitting the 
time between choices. Despite its intuitive appeal, psy-
chologists and behavioral ecologists have demonstrated 
that animals tend to ignore the inter-choice interval, 
maximizing intake over the short-term rather than the 
long-term (Bateson & Kacelnik 1996; Stephens & Ander-
son 2001). Rate maximization predicts indifference be-
tween the small and large rewards in our design when 
intake rate of the standard option equals that of the ad-
justing option: As/(ts+hs) = Aa/(ta+ha). Given the val-
ues from Table 2, we can estimate the predicted indif-
ference point (ta) if the subjects maximize intake rate. 
Because of differences in handling time between spe-
cies, rate maximization predicts an indifference point 
of 8.6 s for tamarins and 6.6 s for marmosets (table 2). 
While the marmosets waited longer than expected by 
the rate maximization model (t8 = 4.5, p < 0.01), the tam-
arins’ mean indifference point did not differ from the 
rate maximization prediction (t10 = −0.1, p = 0.91). Thus, 
the tamarins appear to maximize their short-term intake 
rate, whereas the marmosets have a longer time hori-
zon, resulting in more self-controlled choices.
4. Discussion
The striking difference in discounting behavior be-
tween tamarins and marmosets is surprising given their 
close phylogenetic relationship and comparable biology. 
The two species share similar mating systems, group 
sizes, cooperative behaviors and general ecology (Table 
1). We suggest that a key difference between these spe-
cies—their feeding ecology—may explain this difference.
Relative to other factors, ecological differences be-
tween species have been little explored as a selective 
pressure on discounting. As noted, one significant eco-
logical difference between marmosets and tamarins is 
their diet. Although both species feed on fruit, marmo-
sets specialize on plant exudates whereas tamarins fo-
cus more on insects (Coimbra-Filho & Mittermeier 1976; 
Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson & Rylands 1988). 
Feeding on insects may require greater impulsivity to 
take advantage of ephemeral bouts of availability. For-
aging on exudates has led to a number of specialized 
adaptations in marmosets such as modified teeth for 
gouging and modified digestive physiology (Coim-
bra-Filho & Mittermeier 1976; Harrison & Tardif 1994; 
Power & Oftedal 1996). Harrison & Tardif (1994) also 
contend that the concentrated nature of gum-exuding 
feeding sites may reduce gummivore home range sizes, 
possibly accounting for the differences between tama-
rins and marmosets. We contend that gummivory may 
have led to cognitive specializations as well. Because 
feeding on exudates requires waiting for gum and sap 
to ooze out of the plants, marmosets may have evolved 
the ability to value future rewards more than the insec-
tivorous tamarins. Therefore, the self-control needed to 
feed on gums may have selected for a more general abil-
ity to delay gratification. The question remains: did se-
lection increase impulsivity in tamarins, decrease it in 
Table 1. Comparison of traits for tamarins and marmosets.
Trait  Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)  Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus)
body weighta  380 gb  280 gb
brain weighta  10 g  7.6 g
brain/body weight ratioa  0.026  0.027
lifespanc  11.7 yrs  13.5 yrs
home range sized  7.8–10 ha  0.5–5 ha
habitatd  lower to mid-canopy of Colombian rainforest lower to mid-canopy of Brazilian rainforest
group sized  2–13  3–13
mating systemd  monogamy, occasional polyandry  monogamy
parental cared  bi-parental care  bi-parental care
cooperative breedingd  yes  yes
twinningd  common  common
dietd  insects > fruit > gum  gum > insects > fruit
percentage time feeding on gumd  14%e  70%
a. Stephan et al. (1981).
b. Note that these values are estimates from Stephan et al. (1981) to correlate with their measures of brain size. Weights for our subjects can 
be found in the Supplementary Material.
c. Ross (1991).
d. Snowdon & Soini (1988) and Stevenson & Rylands (1988).
e. No data available for Saguinus oedipus, therefore we used a measurement for closely related Saguinus geoffreyi.





































marmosets, or both? Given our finding that tamarins’ 
feeding rate maximizes but marmosets are more self-
controlled than expected, it appears as though selection 
probably favored self-control in the marmosets.
The role of feeding ecology in cognition has been doc-
umented in other species. Species that cache food have 
better spatial memory (Balda & Kamil 1989) and larger 
hippocampal volume (Basil et al. 1996) than closely re-
lated non-caching species. In addition, fruit-eating pri-
mates, such as spider monkeys, have larger brains than 
leaf-eating species such as howler monkeys, presum-
ably to track spatial and temporal variation in fruit dis-
tribution (Milton 1981). The present study, however, 
provides the first indication that diet may influence ani-
mal discounting levels. If this model generalizes beyond 
the current findings, animals with long food processing 
times would exhibit more self-control than those with 
short processing times (but traveling time should not af-
fect discounting). Therefore, we predict that species that 
must wait for food sources (e.g. gummivores, stalking 
predators) should have longer time horizons and lower 
discounting levels than species which immediately con-
sume ephemeral food sources (e.g. frugivores, opportu-
nistic predators); these ecological pressures may be so 
fundamental that even under captive conditions, innate 
species-specific differences are nonetheless maintained.
While highlighting differences in discounting lev-
els between marmosets and tamarins in the context of 
foraging, our data do not necessarily imply a difference 
across all situations. In fact, selection may act on dis-
counting levels in different contexts independently. For 
example, although tamarins and marmosets value food 
differently over time, they may value reproductive op-
portunities equally, given their similar mating systems. 
Yet, in more promiscuous systems in which each repro-
ductive attempt is more valuable, individuals may act 
more impulsively in their mating decisions. Wilson & 
Daly (2004) provide data illustrating how discounting 
might interact with reproduction in humans by dem-
onstrating that men discount monetary rewards more 
highly following the presentation of attractive female 
faces, but not unattractive faces. They conclude that the 
possibility of mating makes men more impulsive. Stud-
ies that correlate discounting levels across contexts are 
needed to determine the domain specificity of these cog-
nitive adaptations.
One alternative explanation of our findings is that 
rather than having different discounting levels, tama-
rins and marmosets value the food differently—that is, 
perhaps marmosets value six pellets as more than three 
Figure 1. Experimental apparatus for discounting procedure. Both 
marmosets and tamarins experience the same choices: pulling one 
of two tools. One tool yielded two food pellets after no delay, and 
the other tool yielded six food pellets after a longer delay. Transpar-
ent Plexiglas covers prevented access to the pellets until the delay 
expired.
Figure 2. Species differences in discounting levels. Marmosets and 
tamarins differed in their indifference points with marmosets wait-
ing almost twice as long for the six pellets than tamarins. The tam-
arin indifference point does not differ from that expected, but mar-
mosets exhibit more self-control than predicted by short-term rate 
maximization. Error bars represent standard error of the mean indif-
ference points.




   oedipus)   jacchus)
standard amount (As)  2 pellets  2 pellets
adjusting amount (Aa)  6 pellets  6 pellets
standard delay (ts)
a  0.1 s  0.1 s
standard handling time (hs)
a  10.7 s  8.3 s
adjusted handling time (ha)
a  27.1 s  18.5 s
predicted indifference point 8.6 s  6.6 s
   (ta)—rate maximization
a
observed mean indifference 7.9 s  14.4 s
   point
a. See Supplementary Material for calculations of these estimates.
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times the value of two pellets and, therefore, will wait 
longer for them. While difficult to rule out, this alterna-
tive seems unlikely given that motivational measures 
which would temporarily influence value (such as body 
condition) did not correlate with individual indifference 
points. What remains are inherent differences in value 
functions between species, which are notoriously diffi-
cult to describe. Further work on varying quantities and 
qualities of food, as well as different methods of delay-
ing access to food, is needed to disentangle the com-
plex interaction between inherent value and temporal 
discounting.
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Supporting Material 
Material and Methods 
Subjects  
We used six adult cotton-top tamarins (three males and three females) and five adult common 
marmosets (three males and two females) as subjects in this experiment (See Table S.1 for 
more information).  All subjects participated in other behavioural experiments.  One month 
before this experiment, we tested four of the six tamarin subjects (DW, JK, SP, and UB) in a 
pilot experiment in which they chose between an immediate two pellets or six pellets delayed 
15, 20, 25, or 30 sec.  There were no statistically significant differences in indifference points 
for naïve or experienced subjects (F1,4 = 0.28, p = 0.63), although the sample size is 
admittedly small.  Nevertheless, the two naïve tamarins showed indifference at levels within 
the range of the experienced individuals (Table S.1).  All marmosets were naïve to the 
experiment to the self-control paradigm. 
 
The subjects received their daily food allotments after the experiments were completed at the 
end of the day.  Both tamarins and marmosets were maintained at body weights which 
provided the most reliable performance in food-motivated tasks.   
 
Apparatus 
We placed subjects in a metal cage (30×30×30 cm) adjacent to the discounting apparatus.  
There were four holes in the clear Plexiglas front panel of the cage.  By reaching through the 
lower two holes in the wall, subjects could grasp one of two tool handles to bring the food 
reward within reach through the upper two holes (Figure 1).  Transparent covers prevented 
subjects from accessing the food until the end of a delay.  Two solenoids operated the 
movement of the covers to reveal and cover the food rewards.   An experimenter flipped a 
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switch, starting the electronic timer and, after a specified delay, activated the solenoids to 
open the covers.  A buzzer sounded during the delay period. 
 
Trial procedures 
A trial started with the presentation of two L-shaped tools to the subject through the lower 
holes in the front barrier.  The tools consisted of a straight handle and a crossbar trough 
containing food pellets (Research Diet 45 mg banana-flavoured purified diet primate pellets).  
A green tool was always associated with the delivery of six pellets, whereas an orange tool 
always delivered two pellets.  Within a session the tools remained on the same side of the 
apparatus, but they alternated sides between sessions.  To choose one of the reward options, 
the subject had five seconds to touch one of the tools and 30 seconds to pull the tool until the 
trough contacted the front of the Plexiglas barrier of the transport cage.  Minimal effort was 
required to pull both of the tools.  Once the subjects touched one of the tools, the other was 
immediately removed, preventing them from switching between tools.  As soon as the trough 
was pulled forward enough to contact the barrier, the experimenter started the delay by 
activating the timer.  At the end of the delay, the solenoids moved the covers, allowing the 
subject to reach their reward.  After retrieving the last pellets from the trough, the 
experimenter started a 30 second inter-trial interval.   
 
Each session consisted of 14 trials and lasted approximately 15 minutes.  Four of the 14 trials 
were forced trials; the other 10 were free choice trials.  In forced trials we only presented one 
tool to the subject, with the other tool remaining in sight but out of reach.  A session always 
started with two forced trials: one forced the larger reward and one forced the smaller.  We 
alternated the order of this presentation between sessions. We randomly interspersed the 
remaining two forced trials (one of each choice) throughout the session.  The other ten trials 
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were free choice trials which allowed subjects to choose between rewards by pulling one of 
the two tools.   
 
Experimental design 
Throughout the experiment, subjects received access to the small reward immediately 
(standard option).  The delay for the large reward (adjusting option) was constant within a 
session but varied between sessions.  In the first session, it started at zero and increased by 
one second for the next session if the subject chose the larger of the rewards seven or more 
times.  Similarly, if the subject picked the smaller reward seven or more times, the adjusting 
delay decreased by one second in the following session.  If the subject chose neither tool 
seven or more times, the delay remained the same for the next session.  By adjusting the 
delay, we were able to find the point at which the subjects were indifferent between the 
smaller, immediate option and the larger, delayed option.  We calculated this indifference 
point by comparing the mean delay to large for the last five completed sessions with the mean 
of the previous five sessions.  Subjects reached indifference when the mean delay of the last 
five sessions did not differ from the mean delay of the preceding five sessions by more than 
10% or one second, whichever was larger.  We used the mean delay of the last five sessions 
as our estimate for the indifference point.   
 
 
Calculating delays, handling times, and indifference points 
Standard delay time (ts) was the estimated time between toggling switch and food becoming 
available (0.1 sec).  Handling times (hs and ha) were estimated from measurements of the 
time between the first and last reach for pellets in six forced short-delay trials and six forced 
long-delay trials for each subject.  Each species’ predicted indifference points (ta) are a mean 
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of individual subject predicted indifference points.  That is, we applied the rate maximization 
equation to each subject rather than to the overall species means.  If predicted indifference 
points were negative for a subject, we used a time of zero sec.  This accounts for the 
discrepancy between the stated predicted indifference point for tamarins (ta=8.6 sec) and that 
calculated using the overall species means. 
 
This experiment was conducted in compliance with the Harvard University Animal Care 




Although sample sizes are small, there are no sex differences in indifference point (F1,7 = 
0.06, p = 0.81) and there is no interaction between species and sex (F1,7 = 0.01, p = 0.91). 
 
Motivation 
To further assess the role of motivation in this experiment, we examined the subjects’ 
performance in trials within a session.  We measured the proportion of choices for the 
larger/delayed reward (arc-sine, square-root transformed) in the last 10 sessions for each 
subject (the sessions used to assess the indifference point).  We then divided the trials into 
those which occurred in the first half of the session (trials 1-5) or the second half (trials 6-10).  
There was a strong effect of trial (F1,97 = 6.49, p = 0.01)—subjects chose the larger/delayed 
reward more in the first five trials.  Significantly, there was no species effect or species by 
trial interaction (Figure S.1).  Therefore, motivation changed within a session but was the 
same for both species, suggesting that their general motivational levels were roughly equal. 
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Table S.1: Subject data for weights, handling times, and indifference points 










AG Tamarin M 413 18.3 16.5 7.6 
DW Tamarin M 322 6.7 23.8 8.4 
JG Tamarin F 431 11.2 21.2 9.2 
JK Tamarin F 376 4.8 15.8 5.6 
SP Tamarin M 435 9 39 6.7 
UB Tamarin F 404 14.2 46 9.8 
Mean Tamarin  397 10.7 27.1 7.9 
       
Ant Marmoset M 254 8.7 18 10 
Des Marmoset F 340 10 21.8 16.2 
Jul Marmoset F 394 6.2 13.8 12.8 
Oth Marmoset M 294 8.8 20.3 13.8 
Rom Marmoset M 335 7.7 18.5 19 
Mean Marmoset  324 8.3 18.5 14.4 
 
 












































Figure S.1:   Species and trial effects on choices.  Both species chose the larger/delayed 
option more often in the first five trials of a session than in the last five trials.  There is no 
species by trial interaction, suggesting that both species faced similar changes in motivation 
within a session. 
